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Objectives: Ebola hemorrhagic fever has killed over 1300 people, mostly in
equatorial Africa. There is still uncertainty about the natural reservoir of the
virus and about some of the factors involved in disease transmission. Until now,
a maximum incubation period of 21 days has been assumed.
Methods: We analyzed data collected during the Ebola outbreak (subtype Zaire)
in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 1995 using maximum likelihood
inference and assuming a log-normally distributed incubation period.
Results: The mean incubation period was estimated to be 12.7 days (standard
deviation 4.31 days), indicating that about 4.1% of patients may have incubation
periods longer than 21 days.
Conclusion: If the risk of new cases is to be reduced to 1% then 25 days should be
used when investigating the source of an outbreak, when determining the
duration of surveillance for contacts, and when declaring the end of an outbreak.1. Introduction
Ebola hemorrhagic fever, caused by the Ebola virus
(EBOV) is a severe and often fatal disease. The first
known outbreak occurred in Zaire (now the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo) in 1976. Since then, single
cases and large epidemics have recurred in equatorial
Africa. Apart from Zaire, Sudan, Gabon, Ivory Coast,
Uganda, Kenya, Angola and the Republic of the Congo
have all been affected [1]. Until now, more than 1850
cases and about 1300 deaths have been reported [2];
the latest are from an outbreak in Uganda. Marburg
virus, a close relative of EBOV [3], also causes severee
ibuted under the terms o
y-nc/3.0) which permits unr
is properly cited.
ol and Prevention. Publisheoutbreaks of hemorrhagic fever in Africa [4]. There are
four known subtypes of EBOV named after the place
of their first appearance: Zaire, Sudan, Ivory Coast,
and Reston in Virginia, USA. The former three cause
severe forms of the disease in humans. Subtype Reston
is believed not to be dangerous in humans, but it can
be fatal in non-human primates [5e7] and pigs [8]. A
new strain of EBOV with the proposed name Bundi-
bugyo EBOV was discovered in a Ugandan epidemic
in November 2007 [9]. The subtypes have different
mortality rates (about 90% for Zaire and 50% for
Sudan) and may also have different incubation periods
[10,11].f the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License
estricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
d by Elsevier. All rights reserved.
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[12,13]; bats and fruit bats are suspected to be hosts
[14,15], and monkeys could be a vector in transmission
to humans [16e18]. The two most important routes for
person-to-person transmission seem to be direct physical
contact and contact with body fluids. It is very likely that
droplets or aerosols play little or no role [6,19,20].
When no symptoms are visible, EBOV-infected persons
do not seem to be contagious [21,22]. The incubation
period is generally assumed to range from 2 to 21 days
[10,23e25]; for EBOV most calculations put it at 6 to
10 days [23,26,27]. Knowledge of the incubation period
will aid research on EBOV transmission and is funda-
mental in determining for how long people should be
monitored after having had contact with cases. This
knowledge is also essential when investigating the
animal source that might have triggered an epidemic. In
this paper, we investigate the incubation period of
EBOV using data collected during an outbreak in Kik-
wit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 1995 [22].
This data set is especially useful because it contains
precise information on the contact behavior of 173
persons. We apply an estimation method that was used
to study smallpox [28], but has never been used for
Ebola hemorrhagic fever.Table 1. Infection rates l(t) for different contact types
and disease periods for the Ebola outbreak in
Kikwit 1995. a, b and c are parameters which
are used to construct the infection rate for each
day on which a contact between a case and
a household member is reported
At home
During hospitalization
and funeral
Weak
contacta
Strong
contactb
Weak
contacta
Strong
contactb
Model 1 a a þ b a a þ c
Model 2 a a þ b c c þ b
Model 3 a  b b a  c c
aWeak contact refers to direct physical contact; bStrong contact addi-
tionally involves contact with body fluids. For a detailed explanation, see
the text.2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Description of the epidemic
In 1995, when the outbreak took place, Kikwit had
about 200,000 inhabitants and only two hospitals that
lacked electricity and running water [29]; protective
equipment like gloves was in short supply [30]. On 6
January 1995, a forest worker fell ill with hemorrhagic
symptoms and died some days later. In mid-April,
a nosocomial outbreak began, leading to the spread of
the disease within and between families in Kikwit and
nearby areas. On 3 May, containment measures were
implemented. One week later, EBOV was confirmed by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta,
USA) [31,32]. Having killed 81% of 315 infected
people, the epidemic stopped on 16th July 1995 [5,19,33].
2.2. Data set
The data that we used were collected between 17
May and 3 June 1995 [22]. All members of every
household from which a primary case had died or was
discharged from hospital between 1 January and 7 May
1995 were interviewed. The resultant data set contains
information on 27 households with a total of 23 primary
cases and 173 contacts persons. It also contains detailed
exposure information for each household member. We
used this data to classify the contacts into strong
contacts (contact with body fluids), weak contacts
(direct physical contact but no contact with body fluids)
and non-relevant contacts (only non-physical contact).2.3. Model description and methods
Because the exact time of infection is not known, the
duration of the incubation period could only be derived
from the duration and intensity of contact with the index
case. We were also forced to estimate the rates at which
contacts were infected during the different periods of the
disease in the index cases. Because the available infor-
mation was not enough to allow us to estimate separate
rates for the case’s stay in the hospital and for the
funeral, we used a common rate of infection for both
periods. To distinguish between the effects of strong and
weak contact and between contact at home and contact
in hospital and during the funeral, and to keep the
number of parameters to a minimum, we proposed three
different contact models (Table 1). In Model 1, the
infection rates caused by weak contact are the same at
home and in hospital, whereas the infection rates
produced by strong contact differ in the two places. In
Model 2, the infection rates for weak contact differ at
home and in hospital, and the infection rates for strong
contact are obtained by adding a constant to the infec-
tion rate of the corresponding weak contact. In Model 3,
the infection rates produced by strong contact differ
in the two settings, and the infection rates produced
by weak contact are obtained by multiplying the infec-
tion rate of the corresponding strong contact with
a constant.
The incubation period is assumed to be lognormally
distributed with mean m and standard deviation (SD) s.
This type of distribution is frequently used to describe
incubation periods of acute infectious diseases [34,35].
Having parameterized the distribution with mean m and
SD s, the density function of the lognormal density is
given by
f ðxÞZ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p
sx
exp
 
 ðlnx mÞ
2
2s2
!
;
where x is the duration of the incubation period.
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the parameters. This method is similar to the procedure
proposed by Eichner and Dietz for smallpox incubation
periods [25]. The likelihood contribution of each
household member who escaped infection, is
e

ZN
t0
lðtÞdt
and the likelihood contribution of each household
member who developed the disease, is
Zt1
t0
lðtÞ  e

Z t
t0
lðtÞdt
)f ðt1 tÞdt;
where t0 is the time when the index case first developed
symptoms and t1 is the time when the household
contact became ill. l(t) is the infection rate at time t
(which depends on the type of contact and the stage of
the disease in the index case; see Table 1). f(t1  t) is
the density of the incubation period (see f(x) above)
for the delay t1  t between the household member
becoming infected (unknown time t) and the onset of
the disease (time t1). Because of lack of information,
we assumed that all household members who con-
tracted the infection were infected by the index case in
that household.3. Results
Of the three models examined, the best was Model 1
with c Z 0 (Table 1). The results of the maximum
likelihood estimates and the supported ranges are given
in Table 2.
The mean incubation period m was estimated to be
12.7 days with a SD s of 4.31 days. The force of
infection a for all types of contact during hospitalization
and the funeral, and for weak contact at home, was
0.0254 per day. This indicates that the probability of
escaping infection for one week was 0.84 in spite ofTable 2. Maximum likelihood estimates and supported
ranges for mean m and standard deviation s of
the incubation period and for transmission
possibilities of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in
Kikwit in 1995
Parameter MLE
Lower supported
range
Upper supported
range
m 12.7 d 10.1 d 16.1 d
s 4.31 d 2.56 d 8.60 d
a 0.0254/d 0.0118/d 0.0466/d
b 0.136/d 0.00550/d 0.370/dhaving weak contact with the index case at home or at
the hospital. The force of infection for strong contacts at
home is a þ b Z 0.161 per day, indicating that the
probability of escaping infection for 1 week is, in this
case, only 0.32.4. Discussion
In this study, the mean incubation period for EBOV
hemorrhagic fever was estimated to be 12.7 days (SD
4.31 days). Earlier estimates for EBOV mostly indicated
shorter incubation periods ranging from 6 days to 10
days [23,26,27]. Bwaka et al reported a longer incuba-
tion period for human-to-human transmission compared
to the incubation period for infection caused by a needle
prick [26]. In our study, infections were transmitted
directly and not by needle prick [36], which may partly
explain the longer incubation period estimate. A similar
longer mean incubation period of 11.7 days was detec-
ted in EBOV infected gorillas [37]. For the Ebola-Sudan
strain epidemic in Uganda in 2001, the biggest Ebola
epidemic ever reported, the mean incubation period was
calculated to range from 6.3 days to 12 days [38].
Bwaka et al and Breman et al estimated a mean incu-
bation period for EBOV of 6.2 and 6.3 days, respec-
tively, but both estimates were based on small data sets
[23,26]. Lekone et al calculated a mean incubation
period of 10.1 days for the same Kikwit 1995 epidemic
[27] for which our data were collected; however, their
estimate is not based on the same data set as ours and the
authors assumed an exponential distribution for the
incubation period. If our parameter estimations were
also based on an exponentially distributed incubation
period instead of a lognormal one, the estimated mean
incubation period would drop to 12.0 days. A more
empirical computation that distinguished between
a minimum and a maximum incubation period was
carried out by Dowell et al [22]. The minimum incu-
bation period was calculated from the death of the index
case to the onset of fever in the secondary case. The
mean came out to be 7 days, and the range was from 1
day to 15 days. The maximum incubation period was
calculated from the onset of fever in the index case to
the onset of fever in the secondary case and the mean
came out to be 17 days with the range going from 9 days
to 25 days. Because infections occur between the onset
of fever and the day of death, the mean incubation
period should lie between 7 and 17 days.
Our study had a number of limitations: (i) when
estimating the parameters, 31 of the 200 household
members had to be excluded from the data set because
important contact information was missing (two house-
holds with four and 19 members, respectively, that
included seven secondary cases) or because the possi-
bility that tertiary cases had occurred could not be ruled
out (one household with eight members that included
6 M. Eichner, et althree secondary cases); (ii) because we had to estimate
the time of infection, there may be more variability in
our estimate than if the time of infection had been
known precisely; and (iii) different strains of the EBOV
behave differently and the number of cases exposed via
needles and via direct contact varies in different
epidemics, making it difficult to extrapolate from
historical data to future outbreaks.
However, our results suggest that a longer incubation
period than previously assumed should be taken into
consideration when exploring Ebola transmission
possibilities and when searching for the original source
of the infection that triggered an epidemic. In the past,
EBOV transmission occurred when hunters [39] or
scientists [40] came into contact with monkeys that were
retrospectively assumed to be infected with EBOV.
EBOV was propagated in human populations when
needles and syringes were reused [19] or when health
care workers or family members cared for Ebola cases
[22,41]. Important tools in Ebola hemorrhagic fever
containment are the surveillance of persons who have
been in contact with Ebola-infected patients and the
monitoring of convalescent patients before and after
they have been discharged from hospital. The length of
time these two measures should be carried out and the
announcement of the end of an epidemic depend on the
length of the incubation period. For all three scenarios
that we modeled, a maximum incubation period of
21 days is normally assumed [19,33,36,38,42e44],
meaning that in practice surveillance usually stops three
weeks after the last contact. Epidemiologists have sug-
gested that two consecutive incubation periods (a total
of 42 days) must elapse before an outbreak is declared
to be controlled [45,46]. By combining a rigorously
collected data set with a new approach for calculating
infectious disease incubation periods, our results suggest
that the standard assumption of a maximum incubation
period of 21 days may be incorrect. Our density function
supports durations longer than 21 days. The risk of
developing the disease after the 21st day is 4.1 %. To
reduce the risk to 1%, 25 days should be taken as the
incubation period. A surveillance duration of this length
could be an acceptable compromise because: (i) the
direct costs (surveillance) and indirect costs (economic
cost of quarantines and lost livelihoods) for each day of
observation are relatively small; (ii) there is minimal
risk of further cases after the 25th day, and (iii) vigilance
for Ebola infections by the population and the public
health system should be encouraged so that new cases
are detected early enough.Acknowledgements
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